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Descending the Stable Matching Lattice: How many
Strategic Agents are required to turn Pessimality to Optimality?
Ndiamé Ndiaye∗ Sergey Norin† Adrian Vetta‡
Abstract
The set of stable matchings induces a distributive lattice. The supremum of the stable
matching lattice is the boy-optimal (girl-pessimal) stable matching and the infimum is the
girl-optimal (boy-pessimal) stable matching. The classical boy-proposal deferred-acceptance
algorithm returns the supremum of the lattice, that is, the boy-optimal stable matching. In this
paper, we study the smallest group of girls, called the minimum winning coalition of girls, that
can act strategically, but independently, to force the boy-proposal deferred-acceptance algorithm
to output the girl-optimal stable matching. We characterize the minimum winning coalition in
terms of stable matching rotations and show that its cardinality can take on any value between
0 and
⌊
n
2
⌋
, for instances with n boys and n girls. Our main result is that, for the random
matching model, the expected cardinality of the minimum winning coalition is (1
2
+ o(1)) log n.
This resolves a conjecture of Kupfer [11].
1 Introduction
We study the stable matching problem with n boys and n girls. Each boy has a preference ranking
over the girls and vice versa. A matching is stable if there is no boy-girl pair that prefer each other
over their current partners in the matching. A stable matching always exists and can be found by
the deferred-acceptance algorithm [4]. Furthermore, the set of stable matching forms a lattice whose
supremum matches each boy to his best stable-partner and each girl to her worst stable-partner.
This matching is called the boy-optimal (girl-pessimal) stable matching. Conversely, the infimum
of the lattice matches each boy to his worst stable-partner and each girl to her best stable-partner.
Consequently this matching is called the girl-optimal (boy-pessimal) stable matching.
Interestingly, the deferred-acceptance algorithm outputs the optimal stable matching for the
proposing side. Perhaps surprisingly, the choice of which side makes the proposal can make a sig-
nificant difference. For example, for the random matching model, where the preference list of each
boy and girl is sampled uniformly and independently, Pittel [13] showed the boy-proposal deferred
acceptance algorithm assigns the boys with much better ranking partners than the girls. Specifically,
with high probability, the sum of the partner ranks is close to n log n for the boys and close to n
2
logn
for the girls. Hence, on average, each boy ranks his partner at position log n at the boy-optimal
stable matching while each girl only ranks her partner at position nlogn . Consequently, collectively
the girls may have a much higher preference for the infimum (girl-optimal) stable matching than
the supremum (girl-pessimal) stable matching output by the boy-proposal deferred-acceptance al-
gorithm.
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Remarkably, Ashlagi et al. [1] proved that in an unbalanced market with one fewer girls than boys
this advantage to the boys is reversed. In the random matching model, with high probability, each
girl is matched to a boy she ranks at log n on average and each boy is matched to a girl he ranks at
n
logn on average, even using the boy-proposal deferred-acceptance algorithm.
1 Kupfer then showed
a similar effect arises in a balanced market in which exactly one girl acts strategically. The expected
rank of the partner of each girl improves to O(log4 n) while the expected rank of the partner of each
boy deteriorates to Ω( n
log2+ǫ n
). Thus, just one strategic girl suffices for the stable matching output
by the boy-proposal deferred-acceptance algorithm to change from the supremum of the lattice to
a stable matching "close" to the infimum. But how many strategic girls are required to guarantee
the infimum itself is output? Kupfer [11] conjectured that O(log n) girls suffice in expectation. In
this paper we prove this conjecture. More precisely, we show that minimum number of strategic
girls required is exactly 12 log n+O(log log n) = (
1
2 + o(1)) log n in expectation.
1.1 Overview
In Section 2, we present the relevant background on the stable matching problem, in particular,
concerning the stable matching lattice and the rotation poset. In Section 3 we provide a charac-
terization of the minimum winning coalition of girls in terms of minimal rotations in the rotation
poset. This allows us to show that for general stable matching instances the cardinality of the
minimum winning coalition may take on every integral value between a lower bound of 0 and an
upper bound of
⌊
n
2
⌋
. Our main result is given in Section 4 and shows that in random instances
the the cardinality of the minimum winning coalition is much closer to the lower bound than the
upper bound. Specifically, in the random matching model, the expected cardinality of the minimum
winning coalition is 12 log n + O(log log n). In Appendix A, for the general reader, we present a
running example to illustrate the relevant stable matching concepts and ideas used in the paper.
2 The Stable Matching Problem
Here we review the stable matching problem and the concepts and results relevant to this paper.
Appendix A also contains a running example, defined in Figure 1, to illustrate these concepts. The
reader is referred to the book [6] by Gusfield and Irving for a comprehensive introduction to stable
matchings.
We are given a set B = {b1, b2, . . . , bn} of boys and a set G = {g1, g2, . . . , gn} of girls. Every
boy b ∈ B has a preference ranking ≻b over the girls; similarly, every girl g ∈ G has a preference
ranking ≻g over the boys. Now let µ be a (perfect) matching between the boys and girls. We say
that boy b is matched to girl µ(b) in the matching µ; similarly, girl g is matched to boy µ(g). Boy b
and girl g form a blocking pair {b, g} if they prefer each other to their partners in the matching µ;
that is g ≻b µ(b) and b ≻g µ(g). A matching µ that contains no blocking pair is called stable;
otherwise it is unstable. In the stable matching problem, the task is to find a stable matching.
2.1 The Deferred-Acceptance Algorithm
The first question to answer is whether or not a stable matching is guaranteed to exist. Indeed a
stable matching always exists, as shown in the seminal work of Gale and Shapley [4]. Their proof
1In fact, an unbalanced market essentially contains a unique stable matching; see [1] for details.
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was constructive; the deferred-acceptance algorithm, described in Algorithm 1, outputs a stable
matching.
Algorithm 1: Deferred-Acceptance (Boy-Proposal Version)
while there is an unmatched boy b do
Let b propose to his favourite girl g who has not yet rejected him;
if g is unmatched then
g provisionally matches with b;
else if g is provisionally matched to bˆ then
g provisionally matches to her favourite of b and bˆ, and rejects the other;
The key observation here is that only a girl can reject a provisional match. Thus, from a girl’s
perspective, her provisional match can only improve as the algorithm runs. It follows that the
deferred-acceptance algorithm terminates when every girl has received at least one proposal. In
addition, from a boy’s perspective, his provisional match can only get worse as the algorithm runs.
Indeed, it would be pointless for a boy to propose to girl who has already rejected him. Thus, each
boy will make at most n proposals. Furthermore, because each boy makes proposals in decreasing
order of preference, every girl must eventually receive a proposal. Thus the deferred-acceptance
algorithm must terminate with a perfect matching µ. At this point all provisional matches are
made permanent. But why will this permanent set of matches µ form a stable matching? The proof
is simple and informative, so we include it for completeness.
Theorem 2.1. [4] The deferred-acceptance algorithm outputs a stable matching.
Proof. Suppose {b, g} is a blocking pair for µ. Then boy b prefers girl g over girl gˆ = µ(b), that
is g ≻b µ(b). So b must have proposed to g before proposing to gˆ. Then g must have rejected b.
Either she rejected b at the time of the proposal or she provisionally accepted his offer but later
rejected him after receiving a better offer. As her provisional partner only improves over time, it
follows that girl g prefers her final permanent partner bˆ = µ(g) over b. That is, µ(g) ≻g b, and so
{b, g} is not a blocking pair.
2.2 The Stable Matching Lattice
So a stable matching always exists. In fact, there may be an exponential number of stable match-
ings [9]; see Theorem 3.5 for an example. The set M of all stable matchings forms a poset (M,>)
whose order > is defined via the preference lists of the boys. Specifically, µ1 > µ2 if and only if every
boy weakly prefers their partner in the stable matching µ1 to their partner in the stable matching
µ2; that is µ1(b) b µ2(b), for every boy b.
Conway (see Knuth [9]) observed that the poset (M,>) is in fact a distributive lattice. Thus,
by the lattice property, each pair of stable matchings µ1 and µ2 has a join (least upper bound) and
a meet (greatest lower bound) in the lattice. Moreover, the join µˆ = µ1 ∨ µ2 has the remarkable
property that each boy b is matched to its most preferred partner amongst the girls µ1(b) and µ2(b).
Similarly, in the meet µˇ = µ1 ∧ µ2 each boy is matched to its least preferred partner amongst
the girls µ1(b) and µ2(b). In particular, in the supremum 1 =
∨
µ∈M µ of the lattice each boy is
matched to its most preferred partner from any stable matching (called his best stable-partner).
Accordingly, the matching 1 is called the boy-optimal stable matching. On the other hand, in the
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infimum 0 =
∧
µ∈M µ of the lattice each boy is matched to its least preferred partner from any stable
matching (called his worst stable-partner). Accordingly, the matching 0 is called the boy-pessimal
stable matching.
Theorem 2.2. [4] The deferred-acceptance algorithm outputs the boy-optimal stable matching.
Proof. If not, let b be the first boy rejected by a stable partner, say g, during the course of the
deferred-acceptance algorithm. Let (b, g) be matched in the stable matching µˆ and assume that g
rejects b in favour of the boy bˆ. By assumption, boy bˆ had not been rejected by any stable-partner
at this time. Thus bˆ prefers g over any stable partner. In particular, he prefers g over his stable
partner µˆ(b) 6= g. But then g ≻bˆ µˆ(bˆ) and bˆ ≻g µˆ(g) = b. Hence, {bˆ, g} is a blocking pair for the
matching µˆ, a contradiction.
The reader may have observed that the description of the deferred-acceptance algorithm given
in Algorithm 1 is ill-specified. In particular, which unmatched boy is selected to make the next
proposal? Theorem 2.2 explains the laxity of our description. It is irrelevant which unmatched
boy is chosen in each step, the final outcome is guaranteed to be the boy-optimal stable matching!
In fact, the original description of the algorithm by Gale and Shapley [4] allowed for simultaneous
proposals by unmatched boys – again this has no effect on the stable matching output.
The inverse poset (M,6) is also of fundamental interest. Indeed, McVitie and Wilson [12] made
the surprising observation that (M,6) is the lattice defined using the preference lists of the girls
rather than the boys. That is, every boy weakly prefers their partner in the stable matching µ1 to
their partner in the stable matching µ2 if and only if every girl weakly prefers their partner in the
stable matching µ2 to their partner in the stable matching µ1.
Theorem 2.3. [12] If µ1 > µ2 in the lattice (M,>) then every girl weakly prefers µ2 over µ1.
Proof. Assume there is a girl g who prefers boy b = µ1(g) over boy µ2(g). But, by assumption,
boy b prefers g = µ1(b) over girl µ2(b). Thus {b, g} is a blocking pair for the matching µ2, a
contradiction.
Consequently, the boy-optimal stable matching 1 is the girl-pessimal stable matching and the
boy-pessimal stable matching 0 is the girl-optimal stable matching.
For our running example, the set of stable matchings and the stable matching lattice are shown
in Figure 5 and Figure 6 of Appendix A, respectively.
2.3 The Rotation Poset
Recall that the lattice (M,>) is a distributive lattice. This is important because the fundamental
theorem for finite distributive lattices of Birkhoff [2] states that associated with any distributive
lattice L is a unique auxiliary poset P(L). Specifically, the order ideals (or down-sets) of the
auxiliary poset P, ordered by inclusion, form the lattice L. We refer the reader to the book of
Stanley [16] for details on the fundamental theorem for finite distributive lattices. For our purposes,
however, it is sufficient to note that the auxiliary poset P for the stable matching lattice (M,>)
has an elegant combinatorial description that is very amenable in studying stable matchings.
In particular, the auxiliary poset for the stable matching lattice is called the rotation poset
P = (R,≥) and was first discovered by Irving and Leather [8]. The elements of the auxiliary
poset are rotations. Informally, given a stable matching µ, a rotation will rearrange the partners
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of a suitably chosen subset of the boys in a circular fashion to produce another stable matching.
Formally, a rotation R ∈ R is a subset of the pairs in the stable matching µ, without loss of
generality R = {(b0, g0), (b1, g1), . . . , (bk, gk)}, such that for each boy bi, the girl gi+1 (mod k+1) is the
first girl after his current stable-partner gi on his preference list who would accept a proposal from
him. That is, gi+1 prefers boy bi over her current partner boy bi+1 and every girl g that boy bi ranks
on his list between gi and gi+1 prefers her current partner in µ over bi.
In this case, we say that R is a rotation exposed by the stable matching µ. Let µˆ = µ⊗R be the
perfect matching obtained by matching boy bi with the girl gi+1 (mod k+1), for each 0 ≤ i ≤ k, with
all other matches the same as in µ. Irving and Leather [8] showed that µˆ is also a stable matching.
More importantly they proved:
Theorem 2.4. [8] The matching µˆ is covered2 by µ in the Hasse diagram of the stable matching
lattice if and only if µˆ = µ⊗R for some rotation R exposed by µ.
Theorem 2.4 implies that we may traverse the stable matching lattice (M,>) using rotations.
As stated, we may also derive a poset P = (R,≥) whose elements are rotations. Let Rµ be the set of
all rotations exposed in µ. Then R = ⋃µ∈MRµ is the set of all rotations. We then define the partial
order ≥ as follows. Let R1 ≥ R2 in P if and only if for any stable matching µ1 ∈ {µ ∈M : R1 ∈ Rµ}
and any stable matching µ2 ∈ {µ ∈ M : R2 ∈ Rµ}, either µ1 and µ2 are incomparable or µ1 > µ2
in (M,>). This rotation poset P = (R,≥) is the auxiliary poset for the stable matching lattice
(M,>); see Gusfield and Irving [6]. In particular, there is a bijection between stable matchings and
antichains of the rotation poset.
The set of rotations and the rotation poset for our running example are illustrated in Figure 3
and Figure 4 of Appendix A, respectively.
We remark that, unlike the stable matching lattice, the cardinality of the rotation poset is always
polynomial. Specifically, any boy-girl pair {b, g} can appear in at most one rotation. It immediately
follows that the rotation poset has at most O(n2) elements; in fact, Gusfield [5] showed how to find
all the rotations in O(n2) time.
3 Incentives in the Stable Matchings Problem
Intuitively, because the deferred-acceptance algorithm outputs the boy-optimal stable matching,
there is no incentive for a boy not to propose to the girls in order of preference. This fact was
formally proven by Dubins and Freedman [3]. On the other hand, because the stable matching is
girl-pessimal, it can be beneficial for a girl to strategize. Indeed, Roth [15] showed that no stable
matching mechanism exists that is incentive compatible for every participant.
3.1 The Minimum Winning Coalition of Girls
The structure of the stable matching lattice L is extremely useful in understanding the incentives
that arise in the stable matching problem. For example, the following structure will be of import in
this paper. Let F ⊆ G be a group of girls and let MF be the collection of stable matchings where
every girl in F is matched to their best stable-partner. Given the aforementioned properties of the
join and meet operation in the stable matching lattice, it is easy to verify that LF = (MF ,>) is
also a lattice. Thus, LF has a supremum 1F which is the boy-optimal stable matching given that
2We say y is covered by x in a poset if x > y and there is no element z such that x > z > y.
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every girl in F is matched to their best stable-partner. Similarly, LF has a infimum 0F which is
the boy-pessimal stable matching given that every girl in F is matched to their best stable-partner.
Observe that 0F is the girl-optimal stable-matching 0, for any subset F of the girls.
Why is this useful here? Well, imagine that each girl in F rejects anyone who isn’t their best
stable-partner. Then the deferred-acceptance algorithm will output the stable matching 1F . Of
course, if F = G then the stable matching attained is 1G = 0G = 0. That is because 0 is the unique
stable matching that matches every girl to their best stable-partner.
This observation immediately prompts the question: What is the smallest group F of girls
required to strategically respond to proposals in order to produce the girl-optimal stable matching?
That is, we want to find the smallest group such that 1F = 0. We call this group the minimum
winning coalition and we can find it using the stable matching lattice.
Theorem 3.1. The cardinality of the minimum winning coalition is equal to the cardinality of the
set of minimal stable-matchings in the poset (M\ 0,>).
Proof. Let G2 be the set of girls who have at least two stable-partners. For each girl gj ∈ G2, let
Mj be the set of stable matchings in which she is not matched to her best stable-partner. Then
Lj = (Mj ,>) is a lattice with supremum 1j and infimum 0j . Observe that 1j = 1 and 0j 6= 0.
Now let {µ1, µ2, . . . , µk} be the minimal stable-matchings in the poset (M \ 0,>). For each
1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k, observe that µℓ = 0j for some girl gj ∈ G2. But, if µℓ = 0j then girl gj must be
matched to her best stable-partner in µr for any i 6= ℓ. Otherwise, because µℓ∧µr = 0 in the stable
matching lattice L, it would be the case that girl gj is not matched to her best stable-partner in 0,
a contradiction. Let Uℓ be the set of girls who are not matched to their best stable-partner in µℓ.
Thus, the Uj are non-empty and disjoint.
Let F be any group of k girls that contains exactly one girl from each set Uℓ, for 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k. We
claim that 1F = 0 and, consequently, F is a winning coalition. For each 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k, one girl gj in F
is not matched to best stable-partner in µℓ. Thus µℓ = 0
j > 0. It follows immediately that there is
a unique stable-matching, namely the girl-optimal stable matching 0, that matches every girl in F
to their best stable-partner. Hence, 1F = 0 as claimed.
Conversely, let F be any group of at most k− 1 girls. We claim that 1F 6= 0 and, consequently,
F is a losing coalition. Since the Uj are disjoint, there is some set Uℓ, where 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k, such
that Uℓ ∩ F = ∅. Thus every girl in F is matched to their best stable-partner in µℓ. But then, by
definition, 1F > µℓ > 0 as claimed.
Again, by the fundamental theorem for finite distributive lattices, we can reformulate Theo-
rem 3.1 in terms of the auxiliary poset of the stable matching lattice.
Corollary 3.2. The cardinality of the minimum winning coalition is equal to the cardinality of the
set of minimal rotations in the rotation poset (R,≥).
Proof. Recall the bijection between stable matchings and antichains in the rotation poset. The
empty antichain corresponds to the stable matching 0. Furthermore, the minimal stable-matchings
in (M\ 0,>) arise by performing the reverse of a rotation on 0. In particular, each such minimal
stable-matching corresponds to an antichain of cardinality one, specifically, a minimal rotation in
the rotation poset (R,≥).
Appendix A provides an illustration of how rotations correspond to stable matchings and gives
a minimum winning coalition for the running example.
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3.2 Efficiency and Extremal Properties
From the structure inherent in Theorem 3.2 and Corollary 3.2 we can make several straight-forward
deductions regarding the minimum winning coalition. First, Corollary 3.2 implies that we have a
polynomial time algorithm to compute the a minimum winning coalition. In fact, the techniques of
Gusfield [5] (see also [6]) can now be used to find a minimum winning coalition in O(n2) time.
Theorem 3.3. There is an O(n2) algorithm to find a minimum winning coalition.
Second, we can upper bound the cardinality of the minimum winning coalition.
Lemma 3.4. In any stable matching problem the minimum winning coalition has cardinality at
most
⌊
n
2
⌋
.
Proof. Consider the minimal stable-matchings {µ1, µ2, . . . , µk} in the poset (M\ 0,>). We claim
k ≤ ⌊12n⌋. To prove this, observe that since µℓ 6= 0 there must be at least two girls who are not
matched to their best stable-partners in the stable matching µℓ. Furthermore, recall that each girl
is matched to their best stable-partner in every matching {µ1, µ2, . . . , µk} except at most one. It
immediately follows that k ≤ ⌊12n⌋.
Can this upper bound on the cardinality of the minimum winning coalition ever be obtained?
The answer is yes. In fact, every integer between 0 and ⌊12n⌋ can be the cardinality of the smallest
winning coalition.
Theorem 3.5. For each 0 ≤ k ≤ ⌊12n⌋ there exists a stable matching instance where the minimum
winning coalition has cardinality exactly k.
Proof. Take any 0 ≤ k ≤ ⌊12n⌋. We construct a stable matching instance where the minimum
winning coalition has cardinality exactly k as follows. For 2k + 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n, let boy bℓ and girl gℓ
rank each other top of their preference lists – the other rankings in their preference lists may be
arbitrary. Thus, boy bℓ and girl gℓ must be matched together in every stable matching.
For 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k, let boy b2ℓ−1 rank girl g2ℓ−1 first and girl g2ℓ second and let boy b2ℓ rank girl g2ℓ
first and girl g2ℓ−1 second. In contrast, let girl g2ℓ−1 rank boy g2ℓ first and boy g2ℓ−1 second and let
girl b2ℓ rank boy g2ℓ−1 first and boy g2ℓ second. Again, all other rankings may be arbitrary.
It is then easy to verify that two possibilities arise. In any stable matching either (i) both boys
b2ℓ−1 and b2ℓ are matched to their best stable-partners, namely girls g2ℓ−1 and g2ℓ, respectively, or
(ii) both boys b2ℓ−1 and b2ℓ are matched to their worst stable-partners, namely girls g2ℓ and g2ℓ−1,
respectively.
But this implies that to obtain the girl-optimal stable matching at least one girl from the pair
{g2ℓ−1, g2ℓ} must misreport her preferences, for each 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k. One girl from each of these pairs
is also sufficient to output the girl-optimal stable matching. Thus the minimum winning coalition
has cardinality exactly k.
We remark that the instances constructed in the proof of Theorem 3.5 have 2k stable matchings.
This confirms that there may be an exponential number of stable matchings [9], indeed as many as√
2 n stable matchings.
We now have all the tools required to address the main question in this paper. What is the
expected cardinality of the minimum winning coalition? Formally, we want to calculate the expected
cardinality of the minimum winning coalition when the preference lists of every boy and girl are
uniformly and independently distributed.
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4 The Random Matching Model
In this section, we will evaluate the expected cardinality of the minimum winning coalition. We use
the random matching model which was first studied by Wilson [17] and subsequently examined in
detail by Knuth, Pittel and coauthors [9, 13, 10, 14]. Here the preference ranking of each boy and
each girl is drawn uniformly and independently from the symmetric group Sn. Specifically, each
preference ranking is a random permutation of the set [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Our task now is to prove the main result of the paper.
Theorem 4.1. In the random matching model, the expected cardinality of the minimum winning
coalition F is
E(|F |) = 1
2
log(n) +O(log log n)
4.1 Counting Maximal Rotations
To prove Theorem 4.1, we must study the set Rmax of maximal rotations, that is the rotations
that are exposed at the boy-optimal stable matching 1. To see this, recall, by Corollary 3.2, that
a minimum winning coalition F has cardinality equal to the number of minimal rotations in the
rotation poset (R,≥). The goal therefore is to compute the expected number of minimal rotations.
Furthermore, Theorem 2.3 tells us that the inverse lattice (M,6) is the stable matching lattice
ordered according to the preferences of the girls. This symmetry implies that the expected number
of minimal rotations is equal to the expected number of maximal rotations.
In the proof of Theorem 4.1, for the purpose of analysis, it is convenient to view the deferred
acceptance algorithm with random preferences in an alternative manner. In particular, instead of
generating the preference rankings in advance, we may generate them dynamically. Specifically,
when a boy b is selected to make a proposal he asks a girl g chosen uniformly at random. If b
has already proposed to g then this proposal is immediately rejected; such a proposal is termed
redundant. Meanwhile, g maintains a preference ranking only for the boys that have proposed to
her. Thus if this is the kth distinct proposal made to girl g then she assigns to b a rank chosen
uniformly at random among {1, . . . k}. In particular, in the coarse deferred acceptance algorithm
g accepts the proposal with probability 1/k. As explained by Knuth et al. [10], this process is
equivalent to randomly generating the preference rankings independently in advance. Recall from
Theorem 2.2 that the deferred acceptance algorithm will output the boy-optimal stable matching
regardless of the order of proposals. So, for the purposes of analysis, we may assume the algorithm
selects the unmatched boy with the lowest index to make the the next proposal.
Furthermore, it will be useful to describe the cardinality of Rmax in a more manipulable form.
Specifically, for any boy bi define a variable
Zi =
{
1
|R| if bi is in a maximal rotation R
0 if bi is not in a maximal rotation
Then we obtain that:
|Rmax| =
∑
R∈Rmax
1 =
∑
R∈Rmax
∑
(b,g)∈R
1
|R| =
n∑
i=1
Zi
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By linearity of expectation, the expected cardinality of the minimum winning coalition F is
E(|F |) = E(|Rmax|) = E
(
n∑
i=1
Zi
)
=
n∑
i=1
E(Zi) (1)
4.2 Generating Maximal Rotations from the Rotation Graph
To compute the expected cardinality of the the minimum winning coalition we use an auxiliary graph
called a rotation graph. To define this, without loss of generality, let 1 = {(b1, g1), (b2, g2), . . . , (bn, gn)}
be the boy-optimal stable matching. We can then visualize the rotations exposed at 1, that is the
maximal rotations, using an auxiliary directed graph H(1). This graph, which we call the (exposed)
rotation graph, has vertex i for each boy bi. To define the arc set, suppose that girl gi breaks-up with
boy bi. Then, given the remaining matches in 1, let bi make repeated proposals down his preference
list until either the first time he receives acceptance from a girl gj or he reaches the end of his list.
In the former case, where bi will gain the partner of boy bj , the rotation graph then contains the
arc (i, j) and vertex i has out-degree exactly one. In the latter case, the vertex i has no-outgoing
arcs. (See Figure 2 in Appendix A for the rotation-graph H(1) for the running example.)
Ergo, there is a one-to-one correspondence between directed cycles in the rotation graph and
maximal rotations. In particular, after relabeling the agents, suppose that {(b0, g0), (b1, g1), ..., (bk , gk)}
is a rotation exposed at the boy-optimal stable matching 1. Then (i, i+1mod k+1) is an arc inH(1),
and vice versa.
So our task is to count the expected number of directed cycles in the rotation graph H(1).
Intuitively, this appears similar to counting directed cycles in random graphs with out-degrees
exactly one. But there is one large problem. Here there is no independence in the choice of
out-neighbour for each vertex. In particular, the arcs in H(1) share intricate dependencies and
specifically depend on who made and who received each proposal in obtaining the boy-optimal
stable matching 1. (In fact, as stated above, a vertex may even have out-degree zero.) Essentially,
the remainder of the paper is devoted to showing that the myriad of dependencies that arise are
collectively of small total consequence. To do this, we rely on (1). To quantify the dependency
effects, rather than count expected rotations E(|F |) directly, it is cleaner to compute E(Zi).
In evaluating E(Zi) we study the following two-phase randomized algorithm, henceforth referred
to simply as the algorithm, for generating the potential maximal rotation containing any given boy.
In the first phase of the algorithm we generate 1 = {(b1, g1), (b2, g2), . . . , (bn, gn)} and thus partial
preference lists for girls using the deferred acceptance algorithm. Hence, at the conclusion of the
first phase bi is the highest ranked boy in the list of gi for every i. In the second phase we use the
following variation of the deferred acceptance algorithm generating a random variable Z as follows.
We initialize it by
• Choose i1 from {1, 2, . . . , n} uniformly at random.
• Initialize the potential cycle in the rotation digraph containing i1 by setting R = (i1).
Once R = (i1, . . . , ik) is found, we generate the arc of the rotation digraph starting at ik, as follows.
• Let boy bik make uniformly random proposals until the first time he proposes to a girl gj such
that gj ranks bik higher than bj.
– If j 6∈ R then we set ik+1 = j, R = (i1, . . . , ik, ik+1), and recurse.
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– If j ∈ R then we terminate the procedure. We set Z = 1|R| , if j = i1, and Z = 0,
otherwise.
• If, instead, boy bik gets rejected by all the girls then the vertex ik has no-outgoing arcs. In
this case bi1 belongs to no maximal rotation. We terminate the procedure and set Z = 0.
Thus Z = Zi1 where i1 was chosen uniformly at random. The next lemma is then implied by (1).
Lemma 4.2. E(|F |) = n · E(Z) where Z is the random variable generated by the algorithm.
4.3 Bounding the Number of Proposals
In the remainder of the paper we analyze the algorithm to determine the asymptotic behaviour of
E(Z). The state of the algorithm at any point is the record of all the (random) choices made so far:
the sequence of proposals and the preference rankings generated by the girls. Thus we are working
in the probability space (Ω, P ) of all possible final states of the algorithm and the probabilities of
reaching them.
We index the intermediate states of the algorithm by the number of proposals made to reach
it. Let St denote the set of all states of the procedure after t proposals. Thus St can be thought of
as a partition of Ω, and the partition St+1 refines the partition St for any t. A random variable Xt
is St-measurable if Xt is determined by the algorithm state after t proposals, that is X is constant
on each part of St. We say that a sequence (Xt)t≥0 of random variables is a counter if Xt is St-
measurable and Xt − Xt−1 ∈ {0, 1}. Thus counters count the number of certain events occurring
over the course of the algorithm. As an example, the number of successful proposals among the
first t proposals is a counter.
Our main tool in estimating Z is Lemma 4.3 below which is used to control large deviations of
counters. Let Bk,p be a random variable which follows a binomial distribution with parameters k
and p. We say that a collection of states G is monotone if for every state S 6∈ G we have S′ 6∈ G for
every state S′ that can be reached from S. For example, the collection of states in which every girl
received at most one proposal is monotone.
Lemma 4.3. Let G be a monotone collection of states and let (Xt)t≥0 be a counter.
(a) If P (Xt′+1 −Xt′ = 1|St′) ≥ p for every state St′ ∈ St′ ∩ G then, for any λ ≥ 0 and any k ≥ 1,
P ((Xt+k −Xt ≤ λ) ∧ (St+k−1 ∈ G)|St) ≤ P (Bk,p ≤ λ) .
(b) If P (Xt′+1 −Xt′ = 1|St′) ≤ p for every state St′ ∈ St′ ∩ G then, for any λ ≥ 0 and any k ≥ 1,
P ((Xt+k −Xt ≥ λ) ∧ (St+k−1 ∈ G)|St) ≤ P (Bk,p ≥ λ) .
Proof. We prove (a) by induction on k. The base case k = 1 is immediate. For the induction
step, note that if St 6∈ G then the left side of (a) is zero. Thus we may assume St ∈ G and hence
P (Xt+1 −Xt = 1|St) ≥ p. By the induction hypothesis, we then have
P (Xt+k −Xt+1 ≤ λ− 1|(Xt+1 −Xt = 1) ∧ St) ≤ P (Bk−1,p ≤ λ− 1) , and
P (Xt+k −Xt+1 ≤ λ|(Xt+1 −Xt = 0) ∧ St) ≤ P (Bk−1,p ≤ λ) .
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Since P (Bk−1,p ≤ λ− 1) ≤ P (Bk−1,p ≤ λ), combining these three inequalities gives
P (Xt+k −Xt ≤ λ|St)
= P (Xt+1 −Xt = 1|St) · P (Bk−1,p ≤ λ− 1) + P (Xt+1 −Xt = 0|St) · P (Bk−1,p ≤ λ)
≤ pP (Bk−1,p ≤ λ− 1) + (1− p)P (Bk−1,p ≤ λ)
= P (Bk,p ≤ λ)
as desired. The proof of (b) is completely analogous.
In our subsequent analyses we will combine Lemma 4.3 with the following Chernoff bounds that
control deviations of Bk,p from the mean.
Lemma 4.4. For 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1,
P (Bk,p ≥ (1 + δ)pk) ≤ exp
(
−δ
2pk
3
)
and
P (Bk,p ≤ (1− δ)pk) ≤ exp
(
−δ
2pk
2
)
.
We finish this subsection by showing that with high enough probability our process does not
deviate to much from its expected behaviour. That is the running time of each phase is not much
longer than expected, no girl receives and no boy makes too many proposals. To formalize this, let
T1 and T2 be the number of proposals made in the first and second phases, respectively, and let
T = T1+T2. A run is a sequence of consecutive proposals made by the same boy in the same phase.
We say that a state St ∈ St is good if:
I. The algorithm has not terminated.
II. If the algorithm is in the first phase then t ≤ 5n log n
III. If the algorithm is in the second phase then t ≤ T1 +
√
n log3 n
IV. Each girl has received at most 21 log n proposals.
V. Each boy started at most 21 log n runs.
VI. Each run contained at most 111 log2 n proposals.
VII. Each boy has made at most log4 n proposals.
Any state that is not good is bad. Let G be the set of all good states. Clearly, G is monotone. Let
G∗ denote the event ST−1 ∈ G, that is the event that the algorithm is in a good state the period
before it terminates. Let G∗ be the complement of G∗.
Lemma 4.5. For n sufficiently large, P (G∗) ≥ 1−O(n−4).
Proof. It suffices to show the probability is O(1/n4) of reaching a state Sk ∈ Sk such that (i) the
algorithm has not yet terminated, (ii) Sk is bad, and (iii) all the states preceding Sk are good.
Note that, for n sufficiently large, conditions II and III imply that k ≤ 6n log n for any such state.
Furthermore, again for sufficiently large n, conditions V and VI together imply VII; thus, VII cannot
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be the only condition violated by Sk. Hence, it suffices to verify that the probability of reaching
such a state violating one of the conditions II-VI is small.
First consider condition II. Recall the first phase terminates when every girl has received a
proposal. So if St violates II then k ≥ 5n log n and at least one girl still has not received a proposal.
By definition, each proposal is directed at girl g with probability 1/n, for each g. So, by Lemma 4.3
applied to the counter (Xg,t)t≥0, where Xg,t is the number of proposals received by g by the time t,
P (Xg,k = 0) ≤
(
1− 1
n
)k
≤ e−k/n ≤ 1
n5
.
Thus, by the union bound, Sk violates II with probability at most 1/n
4, as desired.
Next consider condition IV. If s = ⌈21 log n⌉ then the probability that a girl g received at least
s proposals is at most
P (Xg,k ≥ s) ≤
(
k
s
)
1
ns
≤
(
ek
sn
)s
≤
(
e6n log n
⌈21 log n⌉n
)s
≤
(
6e
21
)s
≤ n21 log(6e/21) ≤ 1
n5.3
and so, by the union bound, Sk violates IV with probability at most 1/n
4.
The proof of V is similar. Take a boy b. Apart from his first run (and possibly the first state
of second phase), b can only start a run if the girl g he had been matched to received a proposal
in the previous round. This occurs with probability at most 1/n conditioned on the previous state.
Thus, analogously to the argument above, Sk violates condition V with probability at most 1/n
4.
Now consider VI and set s = 111 log2 n. For sufficiently large n, the proposal following a good
state is non-redundant with probability considerably greater than 21/22 by VII. Because each girl
has received at most 21 log n proposals by IV, the probability that a proposal is accepted conditioned
on the previous good state is at least 122 logn . By Lemma 4.3 applied to the counter Xt equal to the
number of proposals accepted by time t,
P (Xk −Xk−s = 0) ∧ (Sk−1 ∈ G)|Sk−s) ≤
(
1− 1
22 log n
)s
≤ exp
(
− s
22 log n
)
≤ 1
n5.04
for any good state Sk−s. In particular, for any such state Sk−s, the probability is at most 15n5 logn , for
sufficiently large n. By the union bound taken over possible choices of k ≤ 5n log n, the probability
that we reach Sk violating VI is at most 1/n
4.
Finally, set l = ⌈12
√
n log3 n⌉. If Sk violates III then the second phase been running for at least
2l steps, and we have previously reached a state S ∈ Sk−l such the second phase contained at least
l
111 log2 n
runs before S. Therefore, the potential cycle R generated in S may contain at least l
111 log2 n
elements. In each subsequent step starting in a good state, the probability that a non-redundant
proposal is made to a girl gi with i ∈ R is at least ln log3 n . Further, such a proposal is then accepted,
terminating the process, with probability at least 121 logn . However, to reach a state Sk the algorithm
must continue for at least l more steps. By Lemma 4.3, the probability that this happens starting
with any given state S as above is at most
(
1− l
21n log4 n
)l
≤ exp
(
− l
2
21n log4 n
)
≤ 1
n6
and thus the probability of reaching Sk violating III is at most 1/n
4.
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4.4 The Expected Cardinality of the Minimum Winning Coalition
To calculate the expected number of maximal rotations we must analyze in detail the second phase
of the algorithm. In particular, this section is devoted to the proof of the following lemma.
Lemma 4.6. Let S∗ = ST1 be the terminal state of the first phase. If P
(
G∗|S∗
) ≤ 1
n3
then
E (Z|S∗) = log n
2n
+O
(
log log n
n
)
.
Before embarking on the proof of Lemma 4.6, we remark that that our main result, Theorem 4.1,
readily follows from it via Lemmas 4.2 and 4.5.
Proof of Theorem 4.1 (modulo Lemma 4.6). Let G∗∗ denote the set of the terminal states S∗ of the
first phase of the algorithm satisfying P
(
G∗|S∗
) ≤ 1n3 . Then P (S∗ 6∈ G∗∗) = O(1/n) by Lemma 4.5.
Since 0 ≤ Z ≤ 1, by Lemmas 4.2 and 4.6 we have
E(|F |) = nE(Z) = nE(Z|S∗ ∈ G∗∗)(1 − P (S∗ 6∈ G∗∗)) + nE(Z|S∗ 6∈ G∗∗)P (S∗ 6∈ G∗∗)
= nE(Z|S∗ ∈ G∗∗) + nP (S∗ 6∈ G∗∗) (E(Z|S∗ 6∈ G∗∗)− E(Z|S∗ ∈ G∗∗))
=
1
2
log n+O (log log n) +O(1)
So let’s prove Lemma 4.6. For the remainder of the section we fix S∗ satisfying the conditions
of the lemma. Let ρi be the number of non-redundant proposals received by girl gi in S∗. Set
ρ = 1n
∑n
i=1
1
ρi+1
. As S∗ is good, we have ρi ≤ 21 log n for every girl gi; so, ρ ≥ 122 logn . We evaluate
E (Z) separately for every choice of initial vertex i1 of R in the following lemma:
Lemma 4.7. For every 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have
E (Z|S∗ ∧ (i1 = i)) = 1
nρ(ρi + 1)
(
1
2
log n+O (log log n)
)
.
Since
∑n
i=1
1
nρ(ρi+1)
= 1nρ
∑n
i=1
1
ρi+1
= ρnρ =
1
n , this lemma implies Lemma 4.6
To prove this lemma we may assume that we reached the state S∗, chose i1 = i, and that the
probabilities of the subsequent events are scaled accordingly. Note that, by Lemma 4.5, we have
P (G∗) ≥ 1− 1/n2. We relabel the states of our process (S0 = S∗, S1, . . . , St, . . .), so that St is the
state attained after t proposals have been made in the second phase. Let Rt denote the (random)
set R generated in the state St. Let Xt = |Rt| be the associated counter.
We now concentrate on the proof of Lemma 4.6. Hence, we assume that we reached the state
S∗, chose i1 = i, and the probabilities of the subsequent events are scaled accordingly. Note that, by
Lemma 4.5 we have P (G∗) ≥ 1−1/n2. We relabel the states of our process (S0 = S∗, S1, . . . , St, . . .),
so that St is the state attained after t proposals have been made in the second phase. Let Rt denote
the (random) set R generated in the state St. Let Xt = |Rt| be the associated counter. First we
show that any proposal made after a good state increases Xt with probability close to ρ.
Lemma 4.8. For any good state St, we have:
P (Xt+1 −Xt = 1|St) ∈
[
ρ− n−1/3, ρ
]
.
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Proof. Let ρi,t′ be the number of non-redundant proposals received by girl gi in a state St′ preceding
St, and set
ρ(t′) =
1
n
∑
i 6∈Rt′
1
ρi,t′ + 1
.
Then ρ(0) ≥ ρ − 1/n and ρ(t′ + 1) ≥ ρ(t′) − 1/n, for every 0 ≤ t′ ≤ t − 1, as Rt′ increases by at
most one vertex in any step.
Let b be the boy making the proposal following St, and let B be the set of girls b has already
proposed to. Then |B| ≤ log4 n, as St is good. The probability that the next proposal is accepted
by a girl not in Rt, thus increasing Xt, is then
1
n
∑
i 6∈Rt∪B
1
ρi,t + 1
≤ ρ,
immediately implying the upper bound. On the other hand, this probability is lower bounded by
ρ(t)− |B|
n
≥ ρ− t+ 1
n
− log
4 n
n
≥ ρ− n−1/3
where the last bound holds as St is good, and so t ≤
√
n log3 n.
Lemma 4.9. 1. For t ≥ log5 n, P
((
|Xt − ρt| ≥ ρtlogn
)
∧ (St−1 ∈ G)
)
≤ 1
n2
.
2. For t ≥ 400 log lognρ , P
((
Xt ≤ 12ρt
) ∧ (St−1 ∈ G)) ≤ 12 log5 n .
Proof. Let δ ≥ log−1 n. Recall that ρ ≥ 122 log−1 n, and so
ρ− n−1/3 ≥
(
1− δ
2
)
ρ ≥ 1
25
log−1 n.
Combining Lemma 4.4 (where t = 0 and k = t) with Lemma 4.3 and Claim 4.8 gives
P (Xt ≤ (1− δ)ρt ∧ (St−1 ∈ G)) ≤ P
(
Bt,ρ−n−1/3 ≤ (1− δ)ρt
)
≤ P
(
Bt,ρ−n−1/3 ≤
(
1− δ
2
)
(ρ− n−1/3)t
)
≤ exp
(
−1
2
(
δ
2
)2
(ρ− n−1/3)t
)
. (2)
If δ = log−1 n and t ≥ log5 n then the last term of (2) is upper bounded by exp
(
− log2 n200
)
< 12n2 .
Meanwhile for δ = 1/2 and t ≥ C log lognρ , the last term of (2) can be instead upper bounded by
log−
C
64 n. This proves the stated bounds on lower deviation.
The inequality
P
((
Xt ≥
(
1 +
1
log n
)
ρt
)
∧ (St−1 ∈ G)
)
≤ 1
2n2
for t ≥ log5 n is derived in the same manner.
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We also need the following two easy lemmas.
Lemma 4.10. We have P (T2 ≤
√
n/ log n) ≤ 1/ log2 n.
Proof. Note that Xt ≤ t + 1, and so for any t ≤
√
n log−1 n − 1, the probability that the next
proposal is directed to a girl with index in Rt is at most
1√
n logn
. Therefore, the probability that the
second phase terminates after exactly t proposals is at most 1√
n logn
for every such t. The lemma
follows by applying the union bound.
Let {bj}j∈J be the set of boys who have proposed to gi by the end of the first phase. (Thus, in
particular i ∈ J .) As S∗ is good, we have |J | ≤ 21 log n.
Lemma 4.11. The probability that at least one of the first
√
n log3 n proposals of the second phase
is directed to a girl gj with j ∈ J is at most n−1/3.
Proof. This claim follows by applying the union bound analogously to Claim 4.10. We omit the
details.
Proof of Lemma 4.7. Let’s begin by proving the lower bound. Let Lt denote the collection of states
St such that
• log5 n ≤ t ≤ √n/ log n
• St ∈ G, in particular the algorithm has not yet terminated,
• Xt ≤
(
1 + 1logn
)
ρt,
• every girl gj with j ∈ J received no proposal in the second phase so far.
It follows from Claims 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11 that P (St 6∈ Lt) ≤ log−1 n, for any log5 n ≤ t ≤
√
n log−1 n.
As any state St ∈ Lt is good and satisfies t ≥ log5 n, the boy bi has already finished the run which
started the second phase. Moreover, no other boy who has previously proposed to gi has lost his
partner and had an opportunity to make a proposal. Thus, if the next proposal is directed at
gi, which happens with probability 1/n, it is non redundant. Such a proposal is accepted with
probability 1ρi+1 . In such a case, the algorithm terminates and outputs Z = 1/Xt. By Claim 4.8,
considering only the contributions of outcomes when the process terminates immediately following
a state in Lt we get the following lower bound on the expected value of Z.
E (Z|S∗ ∧ (i1 = i)) ≥
(
1− 1
log2 n
)
1
n(ρi + 1)
√
n
log n∑
t=log5 n
1(
1 + 1logn
)
ρt
=
(
1− 1
log n
)
1
nρ(ρi + 1)
√
n
log n∑
t=log5 n
1
t
≥
(
1− 2
log n
)
1
nρ(ρi + 1)
(
log
( √
n
log n
)
− log(log5 n)−O(1)
)
=
1
nρ(ρi + 1)
(
1
2
log n−O(log log n)
)
Next we prove the upper bound. Let Ut denote the collection of states St such that
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• 400ρ−1 log log n ≤ t ≤ √n log3 n
• St ∈ G or the algorithm has terminated,
• Xt ≥ 12ρt.
• Xt ≥
(
1− 1logn
)
ρt, if t ≥ log5 n,
It follows from Claim 4.9 that P (St 6∈ Ut) ≤ log−5 n for 400ρ−1 log log n ≤ t ≤ log5 n, and
P (St 6∈ Ut) ≤ 1n for log5 n ≤ t ≤
√
n log3 n. Noting that the process terminates and outputs
Z = 1/Xt immediately following any given state St with probability at most
1
n(ρi+1)
, we obtain the
desired upper bound on the expected value of Z, as follows:
E (Z|S∗ ∧ (i1 = i)) ≤ 1
n(ρi + 1)
∑
t≤400ρ−1 log logn
1 +
1
n(ρi + 1)
log5 n∑
t=400ρ−1 log logn
(
1
log5 n
+
2
ρt
)
+
1
n(ρi + 1)
√
n log3 n∑
t=log5 n

 1
n
+
1(
1− 1logn
)
ρt

+ P (T2 ≥ √n log3 n)
=
1
n(ρi + 1)
∑
t≤√n log3 n
1
ρt
+O
(
log log n
nρ(ρi + 1)
)
=
1
nρ(ρi + 1)
(
1
2
log n+O(log log n)
)
.
This finishes the proof of Lemma 4.7 and thus of Lemma 4.6 and our main result Theorem 4.1.
5 Conclusion
We have evaluated the expected cardinality of the minimum winning coalition. We emphasize
that this is a theoretical result – we make no claim as to its practical value. In particular, our
model assumes full information; more specifically, to implement the associated behavioural strategy
requires that each girl in the minimum winning coalition knows her best stable-partner. Indeed, if
a girl miscalculates her best stable-partner then she risks being unmatched. Full information is a
standard assumption in many theoretical studies but is clearly not realistic in practice. Furthermore,
the assumption of uniform and independent random preferences, whilst ubiquitous in the theoretical
literature, is also unrealistic in real-world stable matching instances. It is an interesting open
problem to extend these results to more practical models that incorporate incomplete information,
correlated preferences lists, etc.
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Appendix A: An Illustrative Example
In this appendix, we present an example to illustrate the main concepts covered in the paper. This
stable matching instance is derived from an example constructed by Hidakatsu [7]. There are eight
boys and eight girls whose preference ranking are shown in Figure 1.
Boy Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4 Rank 5 Rank 6 Rank 7 Rank 8
b1 g4 g3 g8 g1 g2 g5 g7 g6
b2 g3 g7 g5 g8 g6 g4 g1 g2
b3 g7 g5 g8 g3 g6 g2 g1 g4
b4 g6 g4 g2 g7 g3 g1 g5 g8
b5 g8 g7 g1 g5 g6 g4 g3 g2
b6 g5 g4 g7 g6 g2 g8 g3 g1
b7 g1 g4 g5 g6 g2 g8 g3 g7
b8 g2 g5 g4 g3 g7 g8 g1 g6
Girl Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4 Rank 5 Rank 6 Rank 7 Rank 8
g1 b3 b1 b5 b7 b4 b2 b8 b6
g2 b6 b1 b3 b4 b8 b7 b5 b2
g3 b7 b4 b3 b6 b5 b1 b2 b8
g4 b5 b3 b8 b2 b6 b1 b4 b7
g5 b4 b1 b2 b8 b7 b3 b6 b5
g6 b6 b2 b5 b7 b8 b4 b3 b1
g7 b7 b8 b1 b6 b2 b3 b4 b5
g8 b2 b6 b7 b1 b8 b3 b4 b5
Figure 1: A Stable Matching Instance.
This instance has 23 stable matchings. To see this, let’s begin by running the deferred acceptance
algorithm (Algorithm 1) to find the boy-optimal stable matching. Observe that all the boys have
different first preferences. Thus, the boys will consecutively each propose to their first choice who
will temporarily accept; once all the boys have proposed these matches will become permanent.
Thus, the boy-optimal matching 1 = M1 simply matches each boy with his favourite girl. To find
the remaining stable matchings, we swap partners using rotations.
We start by finding the rotations exposed at 1 = M1. To do this we simply search for the for
directed cycles in the (exposed) rotation graph H(1). Recall, this graph has eight vertices, one for
each boy. The first vertex 1 corresponds to boy b1 who is matched to girl g4 in M1. If girl g4
breaks up with b1 then he will propose to his second choice, girl g3. She prefers him over her current
partner b2 so will accept this offer. Thus boy b1 will gain the current partner of boy b2; hence there
is an arc (1, 2) in the rotation graph H(1). To find the outgoing arc at vertex 2 assume that g3
does break-up with boy b2. He will then propose his second choice, girl g7. She prefers him over her
current partner b3 so will accept this offer. Thus, there is an arc at (2, 3). Now (b3, g7) ∈ M1 and
if girl g7 breaks-up with b3 then he will next propose to g5. She will accept as she prefers b3 over
her current partner boy b6. So the rotation graph contains the arc (3, 6). Next consider boy b4. If
his partner, girl g6 breaks up with him then he will propose to girl g4. She will reject this proposal
as she prefers her current partner b1 over b4. So b4 will then propose to his third choice g2 and this
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proposal will be accepted as she prefers him over her current partner b8. Hence H(1) contains the
arc (4, 8). Continuing in the fashion, the reader can verify that the rotation graph H(1) is as shown
in Figure 2.
1 2
34 56 78
Figure 2: The (Exposed) Rotation Graph H(1) at the Boy-Optimal Stable Matching.
Observe that the rotation graph H(M1) contains a single cycle {v1, v2, v3, v6}. Consequently,
there is exactly one exposed rotation, namely ρ1 = {(b1, g4), (b2, g3), (b3, g7), (b6, g5)}. We remark
that this is the unique maximal rotation for this stable matching instance. Thus from M1 =
(g4, g3, g7, g6, g8, g5, g1, g2) we may create one new stable matching by performing the rotation ρ1.
Specifically, we rotate the partners of the boys {v1, v2, v3, v6}. This gives the stable matching
M2 = (g3, g7, g5, g6, g8, g4, g1, g2).
Similarly, forM2 the rotation graph H(M2) contains a single directed cycle {v3, v5, v7}. Rotating
the partners of boys {b3, b5, b7} then produces the stable matching M3 = (g3, g7, g8, g6, g1, g4, g5, g2).
The rotation graph H(M3) contains two directed cycle correspond to ρ3 and ρ4. These are specified,
along with all the other rotations in Figure 3.
Rotation Rotation
ρ1 {(b1, g4), (b2, g3), (b3, g7), (b6, g5)}
ρ2 {(b3, g5), (b5, g8), (b7, g1)}
ρ3 {(b4, g6), (b8, g2), (b7, g5)}
ρ4 {(b1, g3), (b3, g8)}
ρ5 {(b2, g7), (b8, g5), (b6, g4)}
ρ6 {(b3, g3), (b4, g2)}
ρ7 {(b1, g8), (b5, g1), (b7, g6)}
ρ8 {(b5, g6), (b8, g4), (b6, g7)}
ρ9 {(b2, g5), (b7, g8), (b4, g3)}
ρ10 {(b1, g1), (b3, g2)}
Figure 3: The Set of the Rotations R.
These ten rotations form the rotation poset (R,≥) whose Hasse diagram is given in Figure 4.
As shown the rotation ρ1 is the unique maximal rotation, the rotation exposed at the boy-optimal
stable matching 1 = M1. On the other hand, ρ8, ρ9 and ρ10 are the minimal rotations. These
rotations lead to the boy-pessimal (girl-optimal) stable matching 0 = M23.
Applying these rotations in the appropriate order allows us to generate all 23 stable matchings
given in Figure 5.
These stable matchings then form the stable matching lattice (M,>) whose Hasse diagram is
illustrated in Figure 6. In this diagram, each edge is labelled by the rotation that transforms the
upper stable matching into the lower stable matching. For example, the rotation ρ9 is exposed at
M15 and applying it produces the matching M18; similarly, the rotation ρ4 is exposed at M5 and
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Figure 4: The Hasse diagram of the Rotation Poset (R,≥).
Matching Exposed Rotations Previous Rotations g1 g2 g3 g4 g5 g6 g7 g8
M1 ρ1 ∅ b7 b8 b2 b1 b6 b4 b3 b5
M2 ρ2 ρ1 b7 b8 b1 b6 b3 b4 b2 b5
M3 ρ3, ρ4 ρ2 b5 b8 b1 b6 b7 b4 b2 b3
M4 ρ3 ρ4 b5 b8 b3 b6 b7 b4 b2 b1
M5 ρ4, ρ5 ρ3 b5 b4 b1 b6 b8 b7 b2 b3
M6 ρ5, ρ6, ρ7 ρ3, ρ4 b5 b4 b3 b6 b8 b7 b2 b1
M7 ρ4 ρ5 b5 b4 b1 b8 b2 b7 b6 b3
M8 ρ5, ρ7 ρ6 b5 b3 b4 b6 b8 b7 b2 b1
M9 ρ5, ρ6 ρ7 b1 b4 b3 b6 b8 b5 b2 b7
M10 ρ6, ρ7 ρ4, ρ5 b5 b4 b3 b8 b2 b7 b6 b1
M11 ρ5, ρ10 ρ6, ρ7 b1 b3 b4 b6 b8 b5 b2 b7
M12 ρ7 ρ5, ρ6 b5 b3 b4 b8 b2 b7 b6 b1
M13 ρ6, ρ8 ρ5, ρ7 b1 b4 b3 b8 b2 b5 b6 b7
M14 ρ5 ρ10 b3 b1 b4 b6 b8 b5 b2 b7
M15 ρ8, ρ9, ρ10 ρ7, ρ6, ρ5 b1 b3 b4 b8 b2 b5 b6 b7
M16 ρ6 ρ8 b1 b4 b3 b5 b2 b6 b8 b7
M17 ρ8, ρ9 ρ5, ρ10 b3 b1 b4 b8 b2 b5 b6 b7
M18 ρ8, ρ10 ρ9 b1 b3 b7 b8 b4 b5 b6 b2
M19 ρ9, ρ10 ρ6, ρ8 b1 b3 b4 b5 b2 b6 b8 b7
M20 ρ8 ρ9, ρ10 b3 b1 b7 b8 b4 b5 b6 b2
M21 ρ9 ρ8, ρ10 b3 b1 b4 b5 b2 b6 b8 b7
M22 ρ10 ρ8, ρ9 b1 b3 b7 b5 b4 b6 b8 b2
M23 ∅ ρ8, ρ9, ρ10 b3 b1 b7 b5 b4 b6 b8 b2
Figure 5: The Set of Stable Matchings M.
induces M6.
Recall, by the fundamental theorem for finite distributive lattices, the stable matching lattice
(M,>) has an auxiliary poset whose order ideals, ordered by inclusion, form M. We claimed that
this auxiliary poset is the rotation poset P = (R,≥). By inspection of Figure 4 and Figure 6, the
reader may verify that this is indeed the case for this stable matching instance. In particular, we
can see the correspondence between minimal stable matchings in M\ {0} and minimal rotations
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Figure 6: The Hasse Diagram of the Stable Matching Lattice (M,>).
In this case there are three such minimal matchings, namely {M20,M21,M22} and three minimal
rotations, namely, {ρ8, ρ9, ρ10}.
Finally, Theorem 3.1, tells us that the minimum winning coalition has cardinality equal the
number of minimal rotations. In this instance, these three rotations consist of the girls {g1, g2},
{g3, g5, g8} and {g4, g6, g7}, respectively. A minimum winning coalition must contain exactly one
element of each of these groups. For example, the three girls {g1, g3, g4} form a minimum winning
coalition and allow us to descend all the way from 1 to 0. If we select only one girl we descend the
lattice only as far down as M17, M18 or M19. If we select two girls we can descend only as far down
as M20, M21, or M22.
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